## Bogleheads XV!

"The Undisputed Champion of the Long Run"

"Indexing Is Capitalism at its Best"

John C. Bogle

Philadelphia, PA

September 29, 2016

## THE WALL STREET JOURNAL.

THE WEEKEND INTERVIEW with Jack Bogle By Holman W. Jenkins, Jr.

## The Undisputed Champion of the Long Run

ack Bogle is ready to declare victory.
Four decades ago, a mutual-fund industry gray-beard warned him that he would "destroy the industry." Mr. Bogle's plan was to create a new mutual-fund company owned not by the founding entrepreneur and his partners but by the shareholders of the funds themselves.


This would keep overhead low for investors, as would a second part of his plan: an index fund that would mimic the performance of the overall stock market rather than pay genius managers to guess which stocks might go up or down.

Thus was born the Vanguard 500 Index Fund, which this week celebrated its 40th birthday. Vanguard holds, on behalf of its 20 million investor-clients, more than \$3 trillion in mostly passively managed, index-style investments. Not

where we first spoke 10 years ago. This time Mr. Bogle has some hard news for investors. The basic appeal of index funds—their ability to deliver the market return without shifting an arm and leg to Wall Street's army of helpers—will only become more important given the decade of depressed returns he sees ahead.

Don't imagine a revisitation of the '80s or '90s, when stocks returned 18% a year and investors, after the industry's rake-off, imagined they "had the greatest manager in the world" because they got 14%. Those planning on a comfy retirement or putting a kid through college will have to save more, work to keep costs low, and—above all—stick to the plan.

"When the climate really gets bad, I'm not some statue out there. But when I get knots in my stomach, I say to myself, 'Reread your



preserving my career. That's a very selfish thing."

But he's also equally realistic on the bad merger decision, which involved bringing in some go-go managers from Boston to run the then-illustrious but dowdy Wellington Fund during the 1960s stock boom. "The reality of life is, if you have a bagel shop and everybody is pouring into the doughnut shop across the street, if you want to stay in business, you start selling doughnuts. So I did."

Wall Street continues to live partly off doughnuts, of course. Hence the outcry against indexing from Mr. Ackman and Sanford Rernstein. One complaint is that passive, index-style investing distorts stock prices and the allocation of capital across the economy.

Mr. Bogle laughs this off. Suppose half of all investor money went into index funds—today it's



INVESTING

## Indexing Is Capitalism at Its Best

20 SEP 2, 2016 6:00 AM EDT

By Clifford Scott Asness

## Two Gold Medals



## National Institute of Social Sciences Gold Medal for Distinguished Service November 19, 2015

# Pennsylvania Society Gold Medal for Distinguished Achievement December 10, 2016

BASICALLY, FOR "SPREADING THE WORD" ...

## I. Spreading the Word

## My 65-Year Career in the Fund Industry How Many Hits, How Many Eras? ("Follow the Money")

#### An Industry that Sells What It Makes

•1924-59. The mutual fund industry in its promising formative era

#### An Industry that Makes What Will Sell

- •1960-64. Public ownership of advisors—The New Paradigm
- •1965-69. The "Go-Go" Era—Equity "junk"
- •1970-74. The rise and fall of the "Nifty Fifty"
- •1975-90. Money market funds and bond funds—a new industry
- •1991-01. The Information Age and the rise of technology funds
- •1995-07. The TIF (Traditional Index Fund) Era
- •2008-15. The ETF (Exchange-Traded Index Fund) Era What's Next?
- •2015-25. The return to a new normalcy—The triumph of TIF indexing

I'VE SEEN EACH ERA, AND EACH ERROR, DID MY BEST TO BUILD A BETTER INDUSTRY, AND PREACH ABOUT MY CONVICTIONS . . .


Lin-Manuel Miranda at the White House introducing his hit musical "Hamilton"

"... All in the Strength of His Writing,

He Embodies the Word's Ability to Make a Difference"




## How Much has Vanguard Saved Investors? Try \$1 Trillion



#### **How Much has Vanguard Saved Investors?**

Try \$2.1 Trillion



SOURCE: OUR SHAREHOLDERS OWN THE NATION'S SECOND MOST IMPORTANT PRIVATE COMPANY . . .

#### FORTUNE

#### 25 MOST IMPORTANT PRIVATE COMPANIES




Fortune has long celebrated the achievements of massive publicly-held corporations in lists such as the long-running Fortune 500. Today, as even super-hot startups forgo IPOs (at least for now), and some public behemoths turn private, the time has come to recognize the hugely significant contributions of those corporations that choose not to sell their stock to the public.

2. Vanguard | Fidelity (tie)



# "If the trumpet give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself to the battle?" -St. Paul, First Corinthians



INVITED EDITORIAL

## **Putting Investors First**

JOHN C. BOGLE

**WINTER 2016** 

David and Goliath: Who Wins the Quantitative Battle?

VIEWPOINT

John C. Bogle Founder and Former Chief Executive, The Vanguard Group President, Bogle Financial Markets Research Center

The Index Mutual Fund: 40 Years of Growth, Change, and Challenge

January/February 2016

Fall 2016

## The Little Book of Common Sense Investing

"Most investors, both institutional and individual, will find that the best way to own common stocks is through an index fund that charges minimal fees." -Warren Buffett COMMON SENSE INVESTING The Only Way to Guarantee Your Fair Share of Stock Market Returns John C. Bogle Founder and former CEO of the Vanguard Mutual Fund Group

The #1 best-seller on Amazon in the Mutual Funds category since its release on March 5, 2007, some 3,471 out of 3,496 days. Sales so far: 216,000

Why? Short, simple, and persuasive.

Number of Amazon Reviews: 463,

72 so far in 2016:

5 Star 58

4 Star 10

3 Star 3


**2 Star 0** 

**1 Star** 1

Total 72


**BUT LBCSI IS HARDLY ALL...** 


## **Bogle Book Sales**



**Bogle Books Total: 895,000 SPEAKING OF "ENOUGH"...** 

### A year ago, we laughed ... Today?






## II. The Domination of Vanguard

(And the 40<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the IPO of "First Index Investment Trust")


## Vanguard Dominates Industry Cash Flow

Mutual Fund Industry Net Cash Flow Sep. 2015 through Aug. 2016



#### RECORD CASH INFLOWS ...

#### Vanguard Cash Flow, 1988 – 2015 Annually, in billions



<sup>\*</sup>Annualized based on actual data through 8/2016

"OFF THE CHARTS"—LITERALLY ...

### Where's Vanguard?

On the active side, American Funds continued to do well in terms of flows. T. Rowe Price, State Street, and JPMorgan managed to stay positive, but just barely. On the passive side, DFA and Fidelity enjoyed healthy flows, while State Street took a hit.

For the year to date, American Funds and T. Rowe Price are the only active companies with positive flows. Vanguard is not displayed in Exhibit 6 because it would dwarf all the other data points and decrease the chart's legibility (Vanguard's year-to-date flow is \$114.7 billion).

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
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Exhibit 6. Year-to-Date Flows, Top 10 Companies Except Vanguard (\$ Billion)

Source: Morningstar Direct Asset Flows.


## The Competition

#### Assets of Largest U.S. Mutual Fund Managers, 2000-2016



RESULT: OUR MARKET SHARE GROWTH CONTINUES ...


#### Vanguard's Market Share of Stock and Bond Funds, 1974-2016



## **Fund Industry Market Share Leaders**


| Leader   | Years            | Peak Assets         | Peak<br>Market<br>Share |
|----------|------------------|---------------------|-------------------------|
| MFS      | 1935(e)-195<br>2 | \$554 M<br>(1952)   | 15.3%<br>(1950)         |
| IDS      | 1953-1982        | \$7.6 B<br>(1972)   | 15.8%<br>(1964)         |
| Fidelity | 1983-2003        | \$645 B<br>(1999)   | 13.8%<br>(1999)         |
| Vanguard | 2004-<br>Present | \$3.5 T<br>(8/2016) | 22.8%<br>(8/2016)       |

## "The Triumph of Indexing" Growth of Equity Fund Assets—Index vs. Active



THREE FIRMS DOMINATE INDEX CASH FLOW ...

#### The Triumph of Indexing: Cumulative Net Cash Flow 2009-2016



#### AND IT MAKES THE DIFFERENCE ...


#### **Index Funds Make the Difference**

| Manager      | Index<br>Assets | Active<br>Assets | Total<br>Assets | Index % |
|--------------|-----------------|------------------|-----------------|---------|
| Vanguard     | \$2.4 T         | \$1.1 T          | \$3.5 T         | 70%     |
| Fidelity     | \$236 B         | \$1.4 T          | \$1.7 T         | 14%     |
| BlackRock    | \$936 B         | \$450 B          | \$1.4 T         | 68%     |
| American     | \$0             | \$1.3 T          | \$1.3 T         | 0%      |
| State Street | \$463 B         | \$109 B          | \$572 B         | 81%     |

## III. The Fund Industry Changes

(A Review of my 65<sup>th</sup> Anniversary in the Mutual Fund Industry)

## "I Was There" (And I Am Here!) A Tiny Industry Grows into a Behemoth



#### **INDUSTRY LEADERSHIP CHANGES...**

### Changes in Mutual Fund Leadership: Then and Now

|      |  | Total      |                            | Total        |
|------|--|------------|----------------------------|--------------|
|      | 1951   | Assets*    |                            | Assets       |
| Rank | <b>Fund Name</b>   | (Millions) | 2016                       | (Billions)   |
| 1    | M.I.T.   | \$472      | Vanguard                   | \$3,479      |
| 2    | <b>Investors Mutual</b>  | 365        | Fidelity                   | 1,674        |
| 3    | <b>Keystone Funds**</b>  | 213        | BlackRock***               | 1,230        |
| 4    | Tri-Continental  | 209        | <b>American Funds</b>      | 1,216        |
| 5    | Affiliated Fund  | 209        | State Street Global***     | 519          |
| 6    | <b>Wellington Fund</b>   | 194        | JPMorgan Funds ***         | 497          |
| 7    | Dividend Shares  | 186        | T Rowe Price               | 493          |
| 8    | <b>Fundamental Investors</b>   | 179        | Franklin Templeton         | 480          |
| 9    | State Street Investment**  | 106        | PIMCO***                   | 375          |
| 10   | Boston Fund **   | 106        | Dimensional ***            | 272          |
|      | Total  | \$2,239    | Total                      | \$10,236     |
|      | Percentage of Industry   | <b>72%</b> | Percentage of Industry     | 60%          |
|      | Total industry assets: \$3.1   | billion.   | Total industry assets: \$1 | 7.4 trillion |
|      | *Includes associated funds  ** No longer in business.  ***New leaders. |            | ·                          |              |

DESPITE ECONOMIES OF SCALE, EXPENSE RATIOS RISE AND EXPENSE SOAR...

#### **Mutual Fund Expense Ratios 1951 and 2016**

|   |                             | 1951          | 2016        | Change        |  |  |
|---|-----------------------------|---------------|-------------|---------------|--|--|
|   | Conventional Industry Model |               |             |               |  |  |
| MIT/MFS (C)                             |                             | 0.42%         | 1.24%       | +195%         |  |  |
| Investors Mutual/Columbia (C)           |                             | 0.56          | 1.11        | 98            |  |  |
| Eaton Howard/Eaton Vance (SH)           |                             | 0.64          | 1.23        | 92            |  |  |
| Putnam (C)                              |                             | 0.66          | 1.29        | 95            |  |  |
| Fidelity (P)                            |                             | 0.63          | 0.89        | 41            |  |  |
| T. Rowe Price (SH)                      |                             | 0.50          | 0.78        | 56            |  |  |
| Affiliated/Lord Abbett (P)              |                             | 0.75          | 1.01        | 35            |  |  |
| American (P)                            |                             | 0.84          | 0.96        | 14            |  |  |
| Average                                 |                             | 0.62%         | 1.06%       | +72%          |  |  |
|   | New Industry Model          |               |             |               |  |  |
| Wellington/Vanguard (M)                 |                             | 0.55%         | 0.15        | -73%          |  |  |
|   | 1951 Assets                 | 1951 Expenses | 2016 Assets | 2016 Expenses |  |  |
| <b>Conventional Model (above firms)</b> | \$1B                        | <b>\$7M</b>   | \$4.0 T     | \$25 B        |  |  |
| New Model                               |                             |               | \$3.5 T     | \$4 B         |  |  |

Ownership types: (C) Conglomerate, (SH) public shareholders, (P) private, (M) mutual


#### AN EARLY FLAW CHANGES THE CHARACTER OF THE INDUSTRY . . .

## A Funny Thing Happened in 1958: Public Ownership of Fund Management Companies

"No man can serve two masters, for either he will hate the one, and love the other; or else hold to the one and despise the other."

**Luke 16-13** 

## Ownership of 50 Largest Mutual Fund Management Companies—2016



Total Firms with Public Ownership: 39
Note: Firms with Public Ownership in 1951: 1

## The Rise of the Index Fund

|             | <b>Equity Index Fund Assets</b> |            |             | Annual Increase |               |               |               |
|-------------|---------------------------------|------------|-------------|-----------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
|             | 1976                            | 1986       | 1996        | 2016            | 1996-2<br>008 | 2009-<br>2016 | 1976-2<br>016 |
| TIFs*       | <b>\$14M</b>                    | \$591M     | \$83B       | \$1.88T         | +15%          | +20%          | 13%           |
| <b>ETFs</b> | <b>\$0</b>                      | <b>\$0</b> | <b>\$2B</b> | \$1.86T         | +54%          | +21%          | n/a           |
| Total       | <b>\$14M</b>                    | \$591M     | \$85B       | <b>\$3.74</b> T | +22%          | +21%          | 15%           |

<sup>\*</sup>Traditional Index Funds

#### Yes, There Is a Difference

#### Traditional Index Funds vs. Exchange-Traded Funds

#### First Index Mutual Fund (1974)—Principles

- •Own the U.S. stock market
- Diversify to the Nth degree
- •Minimize transaction costs
- •Tiny expense ratio—500 Index: 0.05% (Admiral)
- •Bought to be held "forever" (redemption rate 10%)

#### **Exchange-Traded Index Funds (1993)—Principles**

- •Pick your own index (1,900 now available)
- Diversify within sector you chose
- •Lower expenses ... but often not too low (0.50%)
- "Fringe" ETFs

## All ETFs Are Not the Same Assets, Institutional Ownership, and Turnover

| Largest                    | Total     | Institutional | Annualized | Annualized |
|----------------------------|-----------|---------------|------------|------------|
| ETF Sponsors               | Assets    | Ownership     | Turnover   | Turnover % |
| BlackRock                  | \$932 B   | 65%           | \$5,225 B  | 631%       |
| Vanguard                   | 574       | 43            | 973        | 201        |
| <b>State Street Global</b> | 462       | 60            | 9,288      | 2,243      |
| Total                      | \$1,968 B | 56%           | \$15,486 B | 898%       |

| Most Active ETF Sponsors |        |     |              |        |  |  |
|--------------------------|--------|-----|--------------|--------|--|--|
| ProShares                | \$27 B | 22% | <b>\$974</b> | 3,870% |  |  |
| Direxion                 | 10     | 6   | 503          | 5,755  |  |  |
| VelocityShares           | 4      | 6   | 357          | 11,445 |  |  |
| Total                    | \$40 B | 23% | \$1,833 B    | 4,952% |  |  |

BUT IT IS THE TIF THAT PROVIDES MAXIUMUM CONSISTENCY FOR THE LONG-TERM INVESTOR . . .

#### Old Times or New,

The Durability of Index Fund Superiority


|                    | 1945-    | -1975           | 1985-2015                  |         |  |
|--------------------|----------|-----------------|----------------------------|---------|--|
|                    | Present  | ation to        | Paper Submitted to         |         |  |
|                    | Vanguar  | d Board         | Financial Analysts Journal |         |  |
|                    | Septembe | r 18, 1975      | September 28, 2015         |         |  |
|                    | Average  | Average S&P 500 |                            | S&P 500 |  |
|                    | Equity   | Index           | Large-Cap                  | Index   |  |
|                    | Fund     |                 | Fund                       |         |  |
| Annualized Return  | 9.7%     | 11.3%           | 9.6%                       | 11.2%   |  |
| Index Advantage    |          | 1.6%            |                            | 1.6%    |  |
| Cumulative Return  | 1539%    | 2402%           | 1548%                      | 2494%   |  |
| Index Advantage    |          | 963%            |                            | 946%    |  |
| Standard Deviation | 16.4%    | 18.6%           | 16.8%                      | 17.3%   |  |
| Sharpe Ratio       | 0.38     | 0.42            | 0.39                       | 0.48    |  |
| R-Squared          | 0.96     | 1.00            | 0.99                       | 1.00    |  |

THE PERFORMANCE EDGE OF THE TRADITIONAL INDEX FUND HAS BEEN CONSITENT. CAN YOU DO BETTER? . . .

## IV. Beating the Market?

#### Do You Like These Odds?

Percentage of Active Funds Outpeforming Their Index Benchmarks 15 Years through 8/2016, Adjusted for Survivor Bias



Source: Vanguard, Morningstar.

## Equity Fund Returns: No, Pal, The Past Is Not Prologue. RTM


| Rankings for the 5 years ending 2010 |                   |                    | Where they ranked in the subsequent 5 years |                    |                   |
|--------------------------------------|-------------------|--------------------|---|--------------------|-------------------|
| Quintile                             | 5-Year<br>Return* | Number of<br>Funds | Highest<br>Quintile                         | Lowest<br>Quintile | Merged/<br>Closed |
| 1                                    | Highest           | 1,100              | 16%   | 24%                | 13%               |
| 2                                    | High              | 1,111              | 15  | 16                 | 17                |
| 3                                    | Medium            | 1,105              | 13  | 15                 | 25                |
| 4                                    | Low               | 1,105              | 16  | 11                 | 30                |
| 5                                    | Lowest            | 1,105              | 15  | 9                  | 40                |
|                                      | Total             | 5,526              | 15%   | 15%                | 25%               |

<sup>\*</sup>Excess return vs. benchmark.

Note: Number of failed funds—1,376

# "Relative Predictability" Dominates Vanguard's Asset Base

91% of Vanguard's Assets Have High Relative Predictability (Average pre-cost returns . . . superior post-cost returns)



Note: "Virtual Index Fund" – R-Squared of 0.96 or higher relative to best-fit index.

### In 1974, "Relative Predictability." Now, "High R2."


|                                | Fund Name                           | R2           |  |
|--------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--------------|--|
| Vanguard                       |                                     | (10-Year)    |  |
| vanguaru                       | Index Funds                         |              |  |
| Fund                           | <b>Total Stock Market Index</b>     | 1.00         |  |
|                                | <b>Total Bond Market Index</b>      | 0.99         |  |
| Correlations                   | Active Funds                        |              |  |
|                                | STAR Fund                           | 0.99         |  |
|                                | <b>Explorer Fund</b>                | 0.99         |  |
| The Triumph of                 | Wellington Fund                     | 0.98         |  |
| •                              | <b>Intermediate-Term Tax-Exempt</b> | 0.97         |  |
| Indexing (and                  | Windsor Fund                        | 0.95         |  |
| Virtual Indexing)              | PRIMECAP Fund                       | 0.93         |  |
|                                | Health Care Fund                    | 0.93         |  |
|                                | <b>Average Vanguard Active</b>      | 0.96         |  |
| R2: The percentage of a        | <b>Equity Fund</b>                  | <b>U.</b> 7U |  |
| fund's return explained by the | <b>Average Industry Active</b>      | 0.92         |  |
| return of its best-fit index.  | <b>Equity Fund</b>                  | U.72         |  |

| Ranking F             | und Ma         | nagers    | -Ap        | ril 2      | 016         |         |
|-----------------------|----------------|-----------|------------|------------|-------------|---------|
| _                     |                |           |            |            |             | Average |
|                       | of Ranked      | of Ranked | Star       | Star       | Star        | Expense |
|                       | Funds          | Funds     |            |            | Rating      |         |
| 1VANGUARD             | <b>\$2,967</b> | 127       | 4%         | <b>73%</b> | <b>69%</b>  | 0.18%   |
| 2T Rowe Price         | 470            | 96        | <b>5%</b>  | <b>74%</b> | <b>69%</b>  | 0.77    |
| 3Schwab               | 102            | 48        | 8%         | <b>48%</b> | <b>40%</b>  | 0.48    |
| 4Dimensional Fund Adv | 270            | <b>72</b> | 13%        | <b>47%</b> | 35%         | 0.36    |
| 6TIAA-CREF            | 91             | 30        | 13%        | 47%        | 33%         | 0.49    |
| 9Fidelity             | 1,122          | 252       | <b>25%</b> | <b>42%</b> | 16%         | 0.90    |
| 10State Street Global | 417            | 124       | 27%        | 39%        | 11%         | 0.36    |
| 11 BlackRock          | 1,093          | 365       | <b>28%</b> | <b>37%</b> | 9%          | 0.67    |
| 18WisdomTree          | 40             | 42        | 33%        | 36%        | 2%          | 0.55    |
| 19Janus               | 93             | 36        | 28%        | 28%        | 0%          | 1.07    |
| 20Columbia            | 142            | 102       | 28%        | 27%        | -1%         | 1.10    |
| 22PIMCO LLC           | 299            | 97        | 39%        | 33%        | <b>-6%</b>  | 0.96    |
| 25JPMorgan Funds      | 264            | 85        | 38%        | 24%        | -14%        | 1.05    |
| 27Eaton Vance         | 93             | 112       | 41%        | 25%        | -16%        | 1.23    |
| 28Dreyfus             | 73             | 99        | 39%        | 22%        | -17%        | 1.00    |
| 29 Alliance Bernstein | 61             | 59        | 42%        | 24%        | -19%        | 1.18    |
| 33 Legg Mason/Western | 96             | 83        | 49%        | 20%        | -29%        | 1.21    |
| 36Oppenheimer         | 175            | 66        | 55%        | 18%        | -36%        | 1.19    |
| 39American Funds      | 1,201          | 33        | <b>52%</b> | <b>12%</b> | -39%        | 0.96    |
| 43 Goldman Sachs      | 81             | 63        | <b>62%</b> | 13%        | -49%        | 1.18    |
| 44MFS                 | 181            | 71        | 62%        | 8%         | -54%        | 1.23    |
| 49 Franklin Templeton | 391            | 102       | 70%        | <b>6%</b>  | -64%        | 1.08    |
| 50 Putnam             | 66             | 73        | <b>75%</b> | 3%         | <b>-73%</b> | 1.29    |
| Total                 | \$11,635       | 3,813     | 37%        | 30%        | -7%         | 0.99%   |

Note: 50 largest firms with at least 25 funds rated by Morningstar.

#### LOWER COSTS, HIGHER RATINGS ...

YES! Net Morningstar Rating vs. Expense Ratio




% of 4 & 5 Star Funds minus % of 1 & 2 Star Funds

## **Investment Company of America Expense Ratios and Sales Loads**

| Share Class   | Inception Year | Net Assets (\$ Million) | Expense<br>Ratio | Front-End<br>Load | Deferred<br>Load |
|---------------|----------------|-------------------------|------------------|-------------------|------------------|
| A             | 1934           | \$57,317                | 0.58%            | 5.75%             |                  |
| В             | 2000           | 79                      | 1.34             |                   | 5.00%            |
| $\mathbf{C}$  | 2001           | 1,682                   | 1.39             |                   | 1.00             |
| <b>F1</b>     | 2001           | 1,894                   | 0.67             |                   |                  |
| <b>F2</b>     | 2008           | 3,515                   | 0.41             |                   |                  |
| R1            | 2002           | 84                      | 1.40             |                   |                  |
| R2            | 2002           | 637                     | 1.41             |                   |                  |
| R2E           | 2014           | 11                      | 1.14             |                   |                  |
| R3            | 2002           | 922                     | 0.95             |                   |                  |
| R4            | 2002           | 1,053                   | 0.64             |                   |                  |
| <b>R5</b>     | 2002           | 618                     | 0.35             |                   |                  |
| R5E           | 2015           | 0.01                    | 0.46             |                   |                  |
| <b>R6</b>     | 2009           | 6,313                   | 0.30             |                   |                  |
| American Fund | s Total        | \$1.2 T                 | 0.96%            | 4.45%             | 0.03%            |

#### BUT I BELIEVE IN THE "VALUE" FACTOR ...


#### DFA Large-Cap Value / S&P 500



#### Wellington Fund versus Average Balanced Fund 1929-2016 1.6 1979-2016 1929-1966 1967-1978 **Stolid Returns** The Fall The Renaissance From Grace (then eroding starting 1963) 1.4 1.2 1.0 Wellington outperforming **0.8** Avg. Balanced Fund outperforming 0.6 1950 1960 1970 1980 2000 929


Wellington **6.8%** 3.8% 11.4% Annual 1929-8.3% **8.9** Avg. Balanced Fund **6.9** Return **6.4** 2016 7.7 **-2.6%** -0.1% +2.5% +0.6% LET'S NOT FORGET THE FOUNDER, MY MENTOR AND FRIEND ...

## Walter L. Morgan, Founder of Wellington Management




## V. Looking Ahead

## Looking Ahead—Perspective Cumulative Investment and Speculative Returns, 1900-2016



IN THE LONG RUN, FUNDAMENTALS MATTER, VALUATIONS DON'T.

## Real Returns: Stock Market\* Versus Investment Fundamentals, Rolling 10-Year Periods, 1881-2016




\*Stock Market Return = Investment Return + Speculative Return

#### 49

## **Looking Ahead 1.** Reasonable Expectations for Stocks— **Below Long-Term Norms**





| Hi                  |        | <b>Prospective</b> |       |  |
|---------------------|--------|--------------------|-------|--|
| R                   | eturns | Active             | Index |  |
| <b>Gross Return</b> | 11%    | 4%                 | 4%    |  |
| Costs               | -2     | -2                 | -0.05 |  |
| Net Return          | 9%     | 2%                 | 3.95% |  |

■ Earnings Growth\*

Dividend Yield

Speculative Return\*


\*Assumed decline in **P/E from 23x to 17x** 

WHAT ABOUT BONDS? . . .

### Looking Ahead 2.

### Reasonable Expectations for Bond Returns— Below Long-Term Norms

Source of Annual Returns on Bonds— Initial Yield on 10-Year Treasury and Bond Portfolio\*




\*Assumes accepting moderate additional credit risk and significant interest rate risk vs. the U.S. Treasury 10-year note

YET, **REAL** INTEREST RATES CLOSE TO LONG-TERM NORMS . . .

## But "Real" Returns on Bonds Are Not Far Below Norms

#### **10-Year Treasury Note**



Note: Projection based on 10-year Treasury Yield September 28, 2016

#### PUT THEM ALL TOGETHER IN A BALANCED PORTFOLIO . . .

## Looking Ahead 3.

**Balanced Portfolio Returns** 

Below 50-Year Norm of 8.75% Nominal; 5.15%

Reasonable Expectations: Gross Returns (50/50 Stock/Bond):

3.3% Nominal; 1.3% Real

**Don't Forget These Deductions** 

-1.5% Active Fund Costs\*

or

-0.05% Index Fund Costs

\* \* \*

**Don't Forget:** 

-2% Excess Taxes and Investor Behavior for Active Funds

<sup>\*</sup>Includes transaction costs but not sales loads.

#### Wrapping Up

#### The Bad News:

Lower expected returns than history would suggest.

#### The Implications:

- 1.Investors will have to save more.
- 2.Low costs more important than ever.
- 3. Domination of index funds continues.
- 4.DOL Fiduciary Rule favors low-cost and index funds, particularly for retirement accounts.
- 5. Greater recognition that the past is not prologue.
- 6. Skepticism about fund managers' consistency.
- 7. Reversion to the mean (RTM) becomes part of the dialogue.

#### Tibble v. Edison

# Unanimous ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirms fiduciary duty for retirement plans

From *The New York Times*, 2/24/2015:

Defense lawyer: "it can't be the case that companies have to 'constantly look and scour the market for ... cheaper investment options,' for retirement-plan participants."

Justice Kennedy: "Well, you certainly do, if that's what a prudent trustee would do."

#### Adam Smith

From The Wealth of Nations, 1776

"The interest of the producer ought to be attended to, only so far as it may be necessary for promoting that of the consumer. The maxim is so perfectly self-evident, that it would be absurd to attempt to prove it. ... The interest of the consumer must be the ultimate end and object of all industry and commerce."

Yes, the interests of fund shareholders (consumers) must, finally, triumph over the interests of fund managers (producers).

## Thank you for your confidence.

## "STAY THE COURSE"